Undermined by Aid: The Impact of NGOisation on Sudanese Popular Movements
Azza H.Elamir
Abstract
This blogpost aims to highlight the evolving dynamics of popular organizations in Sudan, particularly focusing on youth movements, from the December 2018 revolution to the 2021 Coup d’état, and the subsequent war and the role played by NGOs. Throughout these periods, the resilience and adaptability of Sudanese youth have been evident, as they navigated the challenges posed by political upheavals and conflict. The revolution of December 2018 marked a significant attempt to reshape the public realm, with youth playing a crucial role in innovative and grassroots activism. In light of the 2021 Coup d’état, popular organizations such as the Resistance Committees gained political agency and were able to form structures despite the political and security challenges. However, the recent war has severely impacted these movements, leading to a fragmentation of in civic bodies and movements and dysfunctioned many of the popular organizations..Throughout these experiences and time periods, the process of NGOisation, which has begun during the late Bashir ers, has intensified, negatively impacting the growth and development of organic forms of popular and youth organizations. Emergency Rooms have emerged as a vital example of how youth-led initiatives continue to provide essential support and organize mutual aid in the face of adversity. This paper explores these shifts and the ongoing struggle for empowerment and political participation among Sudanese youth, while critically examining how NGOisation has undermined the organic development of popular movements.
The Role of Youth in the Revolution
The complex pattern of events spanning the past six years in Sudan has been bewildering, marked by rapid and often tumultuous changes. The youth, in particular, have been at the forefront of these changes, striving to participate and engage politically while also pursuing their life goals and developing their identities. Their role is not static; it is ever-changing and reshaped by the atrocities they face.
During the 2018 revolution, Sudanese youth actively participated in acts of resistance, creatively forming and carving out both spatial and abstract platforms for joint discussion and organization. The revolution represented an attempt to radically reshape the public realm, embodying the true spirit of politics as a new beginning. Although the movement has ebbed and flowed, it has never ceased for the people of Sudan. The youth have crafted innovative ways, utilized existing spaces, and altered the conventional realms of politics and organization. The revolutionary energy displayed by the Sudanese was unprecedented, showcasing their determination and resilience.
The transitional period following the revolution saw the youth challenging the transitional government and the Juba Peace Agreement, demanding genuine inclusion and justice. The 2021 coup d’état further complicated the situation, forcing civic movements, particularly the youth-led Resistance Committees, into new terrain beyond mobilization and demonstrations. This period saw the development of the Revolutionary Charter for the People’s Power, a testament to the intense work done within communities.
The Impact of War
In stark contrast to the revolutionary spirit, the ongoing war has introduced a different dynamic. However, the current war threatens to undo all this progress, jeopardizing the organizational power built over the years and the lives of young people who have defended the revolution. Not only so, but what seems to be more at risk is the organizational and political agency of popular movements in Sudan.
The current situation of the Resistance Committees (RCs) in Sudan is marked by significant challenges and adaptations. Historically, these committees have played a crucial role during social crises, such as the austerity measures during the transitional period and the Covid-19 pandemic. The concept of “emergency rooms” originated during the Covid period, where the RCs provided essential social services. This humanitarian focus often diminishes their political representation, leading some to perceive them as merely humanitarian groups rather than political entities. However, the RCs themselves view their work as consistent, always addressing the immediate needs of their communities.
The ongoing war has further complicated this. The scattering of people has disrupted the traditional methods of meeting & deliberation. Now, they resort to less efficient means like Zoom and WhatsApp. Additionally, the search for personal safety and livelihood has made political engagement more dangerous and challenging. Despite this, they continue their humanitarian efforts and maintain their political discussions, albeit at a slower pace and with greater difficulty.
The Role of NGOs and the International Community
The Broader Political Context of NGOisation
Most large-funded NGOs are financed and patronized by aid and development agencies, which are, in turn, funded by Western governments, the World Bank, the UN, and some multinational corporations. These agencies are part of the same political formation that oversees the neoliberal project and demands cuts in government spending. NGOs give the impression of filling the vacuum created by a retreating state, but their contributions are often materially inconsequential. Their real impact lies in defusing political anger and doling out aid or benevolence that people ought to have by right. This alters the public psyche, turning people into dependent victims and blunting the edges of political resistance. NGOs form a buffer between the state and the public, acting as arbitrators, interpreters, and facilitators.
This approach is also common among UN agencies. According to Veronique Barbelet, INGOs often use sub-contractual partnerships as a means to an end, leading to strict compliance measures, reduced costs, low-quality funding, and short-term collaborations. This is due to the competitive nature of funding, donor pressure to cut costs and risks, and some INGOs’ reluctance to share limited resources.
In recent years, ‘localisation’ has become a key agenda for these agencies. At the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit, localisation was established as a primary goal of the ‘Grand Bargain,’ with 65 major donors, UN agencies, and INGOs committing to make humanitarian action as local as possible. This involves increasing direct, long-term funding to national and local agencies, removing barriers to direct funding from donors, and supporting coordination mechanisms for national aid organizations.
However, localisation is often seen as an imported concept that doesn’t fully resonate with local actors. International agencies may push for localisation using their own language and tools, which may not align with the local context. This can pressure local organizations to adopt international discourses instead of developing their own approaches, further alienating local actors and hindering the development of genuine local solutions.
The Double-Edged Sword of NGOisation: Impact on Sudanese Popular Movements
International NGOs (INGOs) and the international community have played significant roles in Sudan’s political landscape. However, their involvement has often been a double-edged sword. INGOs operate pragmatically, driven by the incentives and rules of the aid system, which encourage them to reduce costs and transfer risks without genuinely sharing power.
A significant hazard facing mass movements is the NGOisation of resistance. While it is important to acknowledge that many NGOs do valuable work, the broader political context of NGOisation must be considered. In Sudan, the funded NGO boom began in the late 1980s and 1990s, coinciding with the opening of markets to neoliberalism. During this period, the Sudanese state, in line with structural adjustment requirements, withdrew funding from critical sectors such as rural development, agriculture, energy, transport, and public health. As the state abdicated its traditional roles, NGOs stepped in to fill the void.
During the Bashir era, the proliferation of NGOs in Sudan was further accelerated by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, in subsequent years, the regime continued its oppressive security strategies, leading to the rise of popular movements and initiatives opposing the regime, such as the Girifna movement and various youth movements. After the separation of Sudan and South Sudan and the South Kordofan war, the Bashir regime exercised increased violence on civilians and civic life, imposing restrictions on the presence of international actors and forcing many civil actors and organizations to leave the country.
The emergence of locally led popular movements, fueled by youth, attracted the attention of international actors and agencies. This seemed like a golden opportunity to penetrate the newly flourishing civic arena. By creating direct links and connections with these activists, it appeared possible to contribute to the agenda of development in Sudan. INGOs drafted and designed programs that involved interacting with those defined as “Change Actors.” Through these change actors, networks of actively involved youth were created, through which these programs would be implemented. Both direct and indirect interactions and involvement with these networks of youth-led popular movements, in the form of funding and institutional support, introduced processes of NGOisation.
International NGOs (INGOs) and the international community have significantly influenced Sudan’s political landscape, often with mixed results. INGOs operate pragmatically, driven by aid system incentives that encourage cost reduction and risk transfer without genuinely sharing power.
A major issue for popular movements is the NGOisation of resistance. While many NGOs do valuable work, the broader political context must be considered. In Sudan, the NGO boom began in the late 1980s and 1990s, coinciding with neoliberal market openings. During this time, the Sudanese state, following structural adjustment requirements, withdrew funding from critical sectors like rural development, agriculture, energy, transport, and public health, leaving NGOs to fill the void.
The proliferation of NGOs in Sudan accelerated during the Bashir era, especially after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. However, the regime’s continued oppressive security strategies led to the rise of popular movements like the Girifna movement and various youth initiatives. After the separation of Sudan and South Sudan and the South Kordofan war, the Bashir regime increased violence against civilians and imposed restrictions on international actors, forcing many civil organizations to leave.
Locally led popular movements, fueled by youth, attracted international attention. INGOs saw this as an opportunity to engage with these activists and contribute to Sudan’s development agenda. They created programs involving “Change Actors,” forming networks of active youth to implement these programs. Both direct and indirect interactions with these youth-led movements, through funding and institutional support, introduced processes of NGOisation and brought about accusations of co-option.
The Complex Consequences of NGOisation on Sudanese Popular Movements
This NGOisation has had significant implications for the organic growth and development of Sudanese popular movements. While NGOs have provided much-needed resources and support, during the transitional period, the coup d’etat and currently the war, their involvement has also undermined local autonomy, created dependencies, and stifled the organic development of many of these grassroots initiatives. The broader political context of NGOisation, driven by neoliberal policies and structural adjustment requirements, has further complicated the landscape, often prioritizing external agendas over local needs and priorities.
National and local organizations in Sudan often feel compelled to adopt the behaviors, language, and operational styles of international NGOs to be taken seriously and to secure funding. This pressure to conform has undermined the authenticity and local relevance of organizations such as the Emergency Rooms. Instead of developing solutions that are tailored to the unique needs and contexts of their communities, they end up implementing strategies that are more aligned with international standards and expectations. National and local organizations that closely mimic international organizations are often rewarded for aligning with the ‘ideal local’ model. This compliance grants them greater direct funding and positions them as gatekeepers to other locally based groups.
International agencies tend to include local NGOs in their projects and initiatives merely for appearances, without genuinely involving them in decision-making processes. This practice, known as tokenism, means that local organizations are often used to give the impression of local involvement and legitimacy, while the real power and decision-making authority remain with the international agencies. As a result, local NGOs may not have a meaningful impact on how aid is used, how resources are distributed, or how strategies are developed and implemented.
Aid and Autonomy: Navigating NGO Influence after the war
In an attempt to bridge the gap between the grassroots and the funding agencies, the strategy of ‘change agents’ once again re-surfaced. Change Agents were identified as activist and national Ccivil society organizations that had access to grassroots groups like the emergency rooms and at the same time were able to fulfil and comply to financing requirements. A coordination body was created under the name of The Localization Coordination Council, its membership were NNGO’s, ERR’s and International partners. The Council’s main role and aims were to coordinate between the funders and the first responders on the ground and to allocate funding for ERRs and other local groups and initiatives working on aid provision and social security.
In an interview with a member of the Localisation Council, he stated that their role was to aid the grassroot groups especially the ERRs and to support them in allocating funding. The council’s NNGO’s membership are responsible for all communication and compliance with donor agencies and by that ERRs are more able to be immersed in their role as first responders. The council works with many ERRs across Sudan and is working on recruiting many more to its umbrella to help expand the reach and attain funds to all local communities.
The key role and wide network the localization council had, it became a key player in the aid sector. All funding and aid agencies directed the funding to ERRs via the Localisatoion Council. This has created hierarchies among local organizations. As the council constituted of formally organized organization they were favored by international donors and agencies. ERRs that are connected with the council are more likely to receive direct funding and play a stronger role in shaping aid delivery. This created a divide between well-established, formal organizations and smaller local initiatives and movements, which may struggle to gain recognition and support. As a result, the voices and needs of the most marginalized and vulnerable communities may be overlooked.
Conclusion
In conclusion, while NGOs and the international community can bring valuable resources and expertise to Sudan, the process of NGOisation has significant drawbacks. It can create dependencies, undermine local autonomy, and stifle the organic growth of popular movements. To address these challenges, it is essential to promote greater local ownership and participation in development efforts, and to ensure that international support is aligned with the needs and priorities of local communities. By doing so, it is possible to create more effective and sustainable solutions to the complex issues facing Sudan.
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