Sudan; The interplay in the State and Militia Play

Abstract
Why does Sudan continue to experience endemic conflicts punctuated by
catastrophic civic wars, crowned with the most recent urban war? To gain a
comprehensive understanding of the crisis faced by the Sudanese state, two key issues must be explored. Firstly, there is a need to analyze the interplay between economic and social factors in this crisis. It is evident that economic crises have occurred simultaneously or sequentially alongside political and social crises since independence. The post-colonial state remains central to Sudan’s economic system across production, distribution, and accumulation levels but has also been associated with violence and the creation and use of militias throughout its existence. Consequently, this is an attempt to expand the scope beyond studying individual social groups or militias to encompass political
economy dynamics within a concrete socio-economic structure intertwined with paramilitary and militia groups that have suspicious ties to the state. This article engages with a theoretical banter, by delving into these complex interrelations between economic, political, and social factors within Sudan’s crisis-ridden state apparatuses, this research aims to contribute towards a better understanding of the theatrical creation of militias from social groups in Sudan and the role played by the Sudanese state in that. This comes at a time that Sudan bleeds of war between the military (the state’s highest coercive security apparatus) and a state legitimized militia.
Introduction
“The war which is coming
Is not the first one. There were
Other wars before it.
When the last one came to an end
There were conquerors and conquered.
Among the conquered the common people
Starved. Among the conquerors
The common people starved too.”
― Bertolt Brecht, Poems 1913–1956

War is a typical case of chaos,producing unpredictable patterns; new dynamicsof changes in society and economy; complete disruption of usual linearities; and new forms of societal organizations and networks. After more than seven decades since the independence of Sudan, the Sudanese state finds itself yet again standing on the edge of the economic, political and social precipice. As the modern state in Sudan grew, it grew with its
militias. Sudan is still experiencing a deep and comprehensive national crisis, the manifestations of which were the recent urban war portraying the failure of the Sudanese state but most importantly the chaotic war state has exposed the relationship between the state and its oppressive apparatus such as militias. In order to better understand the implications of the changes in dynamics in process of militia making in Sudan, positionalities of the state from violence-machines, it is instructive to reflect on recent trajectories of conflict and insecurity in Sudan’s margins, and the agents involved in these events. Through doing so, a change in the
character of recent violent events becomes clearer, with an increased role for irregular militia and paramilitary groups and a shift towards urban and peri-urban clashes, with a noticeably diminished role for rebel groups.
The causes of the conflict in Sudan are complex and deep-rooted, involving political and economic marginalization, failing institutions (especially security and judicial institutions), environmental degradation, population pressure, and ubiquity of small arms as a result of regional conflicts, uncontrollable borders, and past arms distributions by the government to
militias. The ‘militia strategy’1 Sudan pre-dates the past regime of Omar al Bashir and the National Congress Party. A ‘racial’ dimension introduced to the conflict in the 1980s, an ideology based on ‘Arab’ supremacy, has sharpened into an ethnic divide in which the militias are predominantly pastoralists claiming an Arab identity and the rebels predominantly settled, or semi-settled, communities self-identified as ‘Africans’.
The primary actors in the armed violence are the government, rebels and state-legitimized militia groups. Their commitment to the use of violence in addressing problems could be examined from the perspective of the economic and social structures of the country, ideologies,the quest for power at different levels, and the struggle for control of resources.
Here I attempt to map out the theoretical debates that inform current attempts to theorize both the Sudanese state and militias in Sudan, with the Rapid Support Forces as a case study. Initially known as the Janjaweed, the group evolved into a militia that was co-opted by the state, gaining official legitimacy. In 2013, this transformation culminated in the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marking its official status as a paramilitary organization.
The Dilemma of theorization
“War in Sudan is a means to effect, as well as a result of, the unprecedented exploitation of resources — including fertile land, oil, minerals, water, and cheap labour — carried out by the Sudanese capitalist class, prompted by their assimilation into the global political economy in the restricted role of extractors of primary wealth.”2
It is yet still a developing/transforming phenomena that we must now target. To theorize for theSudanese post-colonial state remains a great challenge. The Sudanese state has grappled with multifaceted challenges throughout its history, including recurrent crises, colonial legacies, and
the dynamics of post-colonial governance. One critical aspect of this complex tapestry is the emergence and role of militias within the Sudanese context. Here I aim to dissect theinterplay between the Sudanese state and the creation of militias, shedding light on historical, political, and socio-economic factors, by exploring the already existing literature and identifyingthe research gaps.
2 Alison J. Ayers, Sudan’s uncivil war: the global — historical constitution of political violence.
1 Alex de Waal prefers referring to a militia ‘habit’ rather than the commonly used ‘strategy’.
See, for example, de Waal (2007b).

The emergence and role of militias within this context present a critical puzzle for theorists. To theorize effectively, we must navigate several challenges: In an attempt to understand this relationship, the need to theorize for both the state and militias in the Sudanese context becomes necessary.
On the State
The relationship that is formed during the era of colonization is a two-way street that is to say the colonizer and colonized both are effected by it. This relationship consists of a constant exposure to different forms of violence that go beyond merely the physical. Through the imposition of such violence, this relationship thus enforces a denigration of the colonized
A number of African states have experienced prolonged armed conflicts since independence often pitting the state as one of the principal protagonists against armed groups frequently associated with political opposition. Although many of these contemporary wars are related to
structural weaknesses and the crisis of post–colonial state leading to state failure or outright collapse, they are also linked to colonial legacy. In general, current Post-coloinial states are a product of external geopolitical and economic interests of powers seeking to dominate the local reality, and to a less extent a result of local aspirations, although some actors did take
advantage of the external domination through strategic alliances. The colonizers constructed the states in the colonized countries around a small, mostly European, ruling elite, demarcating borders according to colonial territorial holdings, not along ethnic communities, and tended to
practice the strategy of ‘divide and rule’ to minimize local challenges against the colonial authority.
In the attempt to create sufficient political order to maximize the extraction of resources with minimum investment, the colonial policies encouraged demographic and regional marginalization of state peripheries and promoted economic, political, and social inequalities
and imbalances. It has been argued that poverty was deliberately created and used as a method of controlling colonial subjects.3
The last fifty years of Sudan’s history have been marred by civil war. Protracted armed conflict in many parts of the country has killed, wounded and displaced millions of people. Education and health services have been disrupted, livelihoods destroyed. Much of Sudan’s physical, human and social capital has been destroyed and development opportunities have been squandered.
The costs of the economic distortions of military expenditure, political instability and the atmosphere of hatred and distrust cannot be counted in monetary terms. Successive regimes have manipulated administrative structures to undermine the control of local people and authorities over resources. Identity and ideology, particularly Arab nationalism and political Islamism, have been used to mobilize support to compensate for the governance and development failings of state policies. Elites have mastered the divide-and-rule tactics inherited from the colonial era through their territorial organization of the modern Sudanese state. The result has been under development, exclusion and violent conflict.
The protracted conflict in Sudan reflects the long-standing economic disparities, political exclusion and social and cultural deprivation in the distribution of political and economic power between the center and the peripheries. The country inherited from colonialism a highly centralized authoritarian governance system and an uneven pattern of regional development.
These structural elements shaped the later evolution of the modern Sudanese state and

3 On Sources of Political Violence in Africa : The Case of “Marginalizing State” in Sudan Aleksi Ylonen

contributed to the marginalization of the peripheries, especially in the South. Both factors aremutually reinforcing, since in authoritarian systems economic and social development is often dependent on political leverage and access to political power. Without political backing, marginalized groups and regions have only limited access to social and economic services and institutions.4
The modern Sudanese state has managed to maintain a systematic play of violence in all its kind. As the independence from the colonial power did not bring about qualitative change in the ideology, manners and apparatuses of the state. The Sudanese state carried the nature of the
colonial state to the era of the post-colonial state. In the very essence and nature of the inherited state apparatus rests the economic, social and political behavior by which the state is able to complete its functions.
This Sudanese state tends to have a narrow and highly concentrated structure of power with large parts of population politically, economically, and socially excluded. This exclusion is manifested in the economic, political and social oppression of this group, ie. these groups, or
better refereed to and addressed as classes, are faced with the complete absence of the state. Thus, they are unable to participate fairly in the previously mentioned paradigms. Notably, clandestine economic conduct — often benefiting military leaders, militias, and rebel groups — thrives during wartime. These actors exploit the political situation to enrich themselves, perpetuating violence. The Sudanese state’s failure to address economic disparities has indirectly fueled the rise of armed movements seeking redress. These movements, whether separatist or ideological, find fertile ground in regions where economic exclusion persists.5 Resting on the previously argued nature of the Sudanese state it becomes necessary for us to expand our understanding of this phenomena. For complete exposure of the Sudanese state as a key agent in the production and re production of Violence, an expanded study of the types and manners in which it is projected into the Sudanese society is inevitable. I argue that as the Sudanese state is not independent of social classes or their conflicts, it is in itself the product of socio-economic relations, it produces and reproduces the coercive agents of the state generating violence.
Historical Complexity: The Sudanese state’s trajectory is shaped by pre-colonial civilizations,European imperialism, and internal power struggles. The legacy of tribalism, ethnic divisions, and regional disparities complicates any theoretical framework. How do we reconcile historical
continuity with the ruptures caused by colonialism and post-independence governance?
Resource Politics: The exploitation of resources — fertile land, oil, minerals, and cheap labor — fuels both state power and conflict. The Sudanese capitalist class, assimilated into the

5 Small Arms Survey,Small Arms and Armed Violence in Sudan and South Sudan
4 De Waal, A. (2005). “Counter-Insurgency on the Cheap: The Sudanese Government’s War in Darfur.”
African Affairs, 104(415), 21–45.

global economy, extracts wealth while perpetuating violence. Theorists must grapple with the paradox: How does resource extraction simultaneously sustain and destabilize the state?
State ‘Fragility’: The Sudanese state’s fragility lies at the heart of the dilemma. Its inability to monopolize violence allows militias to thrive. The state’s coercive capacity wavers, leading to a proliferation of armed groups. Theorists must explore the delicate balance between state authority and the empowerment of non-state actors. The sources of the production and reproduction of political violence and war are to be found not
only in the ‘internal’ characteristics of individual Sudanese state but in its globally and historically constituted social relations political violence is to be located within the long history of imperialism, understood as a system of unequal global relations of power that has prevailed over the past several hundred years, through which the subaltern is individually and collectively governed and through which surplus is extracted and accumulated. These patterns of change in the Sudanese state all carried with them, underdevelopment in many of the basic infrastructures
leading to forming a mass population that lacks the very basics. This has resulted in a huge amount of illiteracy, poverty and social, political and economic marginalization.6 The politics of ethnic and regional conflicts were closely related to uneven development of the country and the
composition of the ruling power bloc as Northern and of Arab Islamic culture. The crises of the state and the economy strengthened each other through the politics of spoils and the failure to deliver the goods expected by the population. As the state has failed to fairly allocate and distribute resources it has enabled an environment of conflict, I argue that its inability to monopolize violence has been an enabler of arms spreading amongst marginalized groups (in different capacities).
Since its independence in 1956, Sudan has seen an intermittent civil war. Conflict between1955–1976 and 1983–2005 between the colonially modernized Arab north and theunderdeveloped Christian and Animist south brought widespread civilian suffering. The Second Sudanese Civil War was an intense 22-year conflict between the central government in
Khartoum and the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) . The war started in southern Sudan but spread to other places including the Nuba mountains and the Blue Nile region. The post-colonial state initially co-opted and later established local militias to pursue destabilisation, displacement and counter-insurgency strategies.7 The ideology of ‘tribalism’ has been exploited therefore ‘by the interacting interests of the Sudanese post-colonial bourgeois parties, governments and capitalists in order to maintain political power, accumulate capital and guarantee the continuity of tribalism in the process of societal reproduction’ Following the NIF coup, the Islamist junta elevated tribal militias from a local to a national phenomenon, the Popular Defence Forces, legalizing war by proxy. Earlier attempts at laying foundations for a general theory on the emergence of militias in Sudan go back to the first use of militias and their creation from social groups to the colonial times.
During which the colonial state has utilized militias in the Nuba Mountains in efforts to have
7 Salih, M. A. (1988). ‘New Wine in Old Bottles’: Tribal Militias and the Sudanese State. Review of African
Political Economy, 15(42), 168–176.
6 Munzoul A.M. Assal , War in Sudan 15 April 2023: Background, Analysis and Scenarios

control over the local community and impose their authority in resistance to the societal rejection to the colonial authority. In recent literature however, the Militia stratgey is argued to be first employed, in systematic fashion, in Southern Sudan by the government of Gen. Abdel Rahman Suwar al Dahab in 1985 and has set the pattern for every subsequent war — in the Nuba Mountains of central Sudan, the oilfields of Southern Sudan, and most recently, in Darfur.8The works of Aleex deWal in Darfur; a New History of a Long War, delves into the rise of the militia habits and cases of insurgency in Darfur, highlighting the 1985 drought as a major factor in
these trajectories.

Theoretical Foundations:
Drawing from the extensive literature on the rise of militias in Sudan, the aim is to engage deeper with the intricate dynamics that have shaped this phenomenon. It goes beyond the existing bodyof work by scrutinizing the pivotal role of state policies and the multifaceted violence — social,
political, and economic — exerted by the state, which has precipitated the initial arms holding among certain social groups. This exploration offers a nuanced understanding of how state actions have not only influenced the emergence of militias but also sustained their operations, challenging the traditional narratives that often overlook the state’s complicity in the militarization of society.
Alex de Waal’s Contributions
1. Hybrid Regimes and Militias
Alex de Waal’s scholarship has centered on the concept of hybrid regimes — political systems that blend formal state structures with non-state actors. In the Sudanese context, this hybridity manifests through the emergence of militias as powerful entities. De Waal’s work highlights how
these militias operate at the intersection of politics, economics, and violence. Rather than viewing militias as mere spoilers or spoilers, he recognizes their agency and strategic importance within the broader political landscape.9
2. Resource Politics and Conflict
De Waal’s analysis emphasizes the role of resource politics in shaping Sudanese conflict dynamics. The extraction of primary resources — such as oil, minerals, and fertile land — fuels both state power and militia activities. The Sudanese capitalist class, often intertwined with militia leaders, exploits these resources. However, this very exploitation perpetuates violence, leading to a paradox: the state’s economic interests inadvertently contribute to its own fragility. De Waal’s work prompts us to rethink the traditional dichotomy between state and non-state
actors, recognizing their symbiotic relationship.
3. State Capacity and Monopoly of Violence
Theorizing the Sudanese state-militia relationship requires grappling with the state’s capacity to monopolize violence. De Waal argues that the Sudanese state’s inability to assert exclusive control over violence enables the proliferation of armed groups. The coercive apparatus wavers,
allowing militias to thrive.

This raises critical questions: How can a state effectively govern when
it shares the stage with powerful non-state actors? What implications does this lack of monopolyover violence have for peacebuilding efforts?
Alex de Waal’s scholarship on Sudan provides a foundation for understanding conflict, humanitarian crises, and governance. His focus on famine, humanitarian aid, and political
9 De Waal, A. (2023). Sudan’s Descent Into Chaos. Foreign Affairs.
8 Wassara, Samson. (2010). Rebels, militias and governance in Sudan.

violence complements Elnur’s work. However, de Waal’s emphasis on humanitarian aspects may require integration with socio-economic analyses to fully grasp state-militia relations in their creation and mutual growth.

Theoretical Gaps and suggested directions in State-Militia Relations from a Socio-Economic Perspective would necessitate that the intricate relationship between the Sudanese state and various militias is to be subject of scholarly inquiry, particularly in the context of conflict, governance, and socio-economic development. While existing literature, including works by Alex
de Waal, Julie Flint, Wassara, Noel Stringham and Jonathan Forney, Ibrahim Elnur and many more has explored the dynamics of militia relations and its growth linking them strongly with armed movements and rebel groups, it becomes necessary toshed light on aspects of the state
and militias in their earliest beginning of creation and materliatsation. It becomes evident that several theoretical gaps remain.
In an attempt to understand this relationship, the need to theorize for both the state and militias in the Sudanese context becomes necessary.
In this sec, I identify key areas for further investigation:
Economic Drivers of Militia Behavior:
Resource Control: Investigate how economic factors, such as control over resources (e.g., land, minerals, water), influence militia-state interactions. Resource-rich regions often witnessheightened competition among armed groups, impacting their alignment with or opposition to
state authorities.
‘Patronage’ Networks: Explore the role of patronage networks in shaping militia behavior. How do economic incentives provided by political elites affect militia loyalty and actions? Understanding these dynamics can illuminate the power structures underlying state-militia relations.
Illicit Trade: Consider the impact of illicit trade (e.g., arms trafficking, smuggling) on militia financing and sustainability. Does participation in such activities drive militias toward cooperation with state actors or exacerbate tensions?
Local Dynamics and Social Networks:
Kinship Ties and Tribal Networks: Examine how local contexts influence militia affiliations. Kinship ties and tribal networks often play a pivotal role in recruitment, loyalty, and territorial control. Investigate whether these social bonds shape state-militia relations differently across
regions.
Community Structures: Analyze the influence of community structures (e.g., village councils, religious institutions) on militia behavior. How do community leaders mediate interactions between militias and state institutions? Does community cohesion impact the effectiveness of
state-led reconciliation efforts?
Conflict Transformation and Post-War Reconciliation:
Positive Transformations: Identify instances where conflict has positively transformed state-militia relations. For example, successful demobilization and reintegration programs can lead to former combatants contributing to peacebuilding and development. Investigate the mechanisms behind such transformations.
Addressing Socio-Economic Grievances: Explore reconciliation strategies that specifically address socio-economic grievances. Post-war reconstruction efforts should consider economic disparities, land rights, and livelihood opportunities. How can state policies promote economic
inclusion and mitigate tensions?